Conflict Resolution and Peace Building

The Niger Delta is the southernmost portion of Nigeria, the world’s third largest wetland, an area 3 times the size of the UK. It is home to an estimated 20 million people of as many as 40 different ethnic groups, and, critical to the conflicts that rage in the Delta, home to vast oil resources.

The oil is wanted by the rest of the world, especially the most developed nations and those rapidly developing, such as India and China; benefits from the oil are wanted, and needed, by the poverty stricken peoples of the Delta. Instead, benefits from the oil accrue to the elite few and, though many funds from oil revenue are paid to the Nigerian Federal, State and Local Governments, somehow little improvement results in the lives of the Niger Delta peoples. Neither do the substantial community development funds from the oil companies have much lasting, positive impact. Instead competition, power struggles, inter-community rivalries, jealously and criminality rules in many communities - resulting in conflict and the annual loss of many lives.

The Niger Delta is termed a “zone of high intensity conflict,” with more than 1,000 deaths annually (data from World Bank). Why is this so, and how can the Niger Delta coastline’s “corridor of conflict” become a “corridor of peace”?

Though there are many ethnic groups in the area, the major ethnicity, especially in the three states of the “core Niger Delta,” is the Ijaws. They are the fourth largest ethnicity in Nigeria, mostly fishermen and women of the sea, the backwater swamp and the rivers. Despite their substantial proportion of the country’s population, they have almost no voice in the national government. Their earnings are poor and decreasing, as trawlers illegally prowl the sea too close to the land, within the locals’ fishing areas, and as oil pollution and locals’ damaging fishing practices deplete the marine population. Especially at the ocean’s coastline, soil conditions are sandy and poor, so it is very difficult to supplement declining income with agricultural crops. The GNP per capita in the Niger Delta is below the national average of US$280, itself a very low income. There is little access to safe drinking water in the rural areas, little effectively functioning education, and poor medical facilities. Yet the area is producing 2.26 million barrels of oil per day, providing over 90% of Nigerian export earnings and 60% of Nigeria’s federally distributed revenue (Francis and Rahim 2005).

The violence that is both sporadic in some areas, yet almost constant in others, leads most tragically to injury and death of local people and of oil workers and to the suspension of oil operations, at times cutting national exports by 40%. The violence is not without cause and not without warning. In the early 1990s, the oil industry in Nigeria was warned by traditional rulers from the Niger Delta region that they were losing control of their youth and that soon, unless steps were taken, the area would explode into anarchy. By the end of 1999, that seemed likely. With the beginning steps into democracy, the youths could give voice to grievances repressed during the military era. With no viable response to that voice, no say in the region’s development, and few opportunities to earn income, the youths took direct action, kidnapping oil workers and sabotaging oil installations, while some turned to piracy on the Delta waterways.

There is at least one notable exception to these behaviours, the Bayelsa State Ijaw community of 30,000 people of the Akassa clan who went peaceably about their business of development. It was, in the words of one Reuters correspondent, "a haven of sanity in a sea of madness." (Knight, Alagoa and Kemedi, 2000). The clan was engaged in a process of interactive, participatory development, facilitated by Pro-Natura International (Nigeria) (PNI-N) and funded by an oil company, the Norwegian government owned Statoil, which was beginning to prospect for oil far out at sea in Bayelsa State.

Within a couple of years, the programme grew. Multiple donors supported the program, including foreign embassies, conservation foundations such as the IUCN, development institutions such as the UNDP, volunteer groups such as the Voluntary Service Overseas and local charities, individuals and even other oil companies.

The programme builds peace because Statoil allows the communities to decide how, where and for what priorities the funding available should be spent on. All communities in the clan are treated equally - there are no host and non-hosts, (or have and have not's). An annual planning workshop is conducted where representative from all communities (the General Assembly) comes together to argue, debate and agree its priorities for the oncoming year. Funding for Akassa Development Foundation is made into a dedicated bank account and spent according to a published budget. Expenditure reports are also published along with quarterly progress report. In addition, the ADF reports progress to the General Assembly, a 'community council' like body made up of representative of each community and Clan institution in Akassa. This eliminates causes of suspicion and jealousy. In addition to the General Assembly, Clan Institutions oversee various development areas within the Clan: health, education, skills training, infrastructure development, youth, etc, the full list of Clan Institutions is shown here

Later PNIN expanded their facilitation to development programs in two other areas in the Niger Delta, in Rivers and Akwa Ibom state. More recently, PNI has begun facilitation in other Niger Delta regions and, by request from a northern Nigerian state, Yobe, has trained their Local Government Chairs and Special Advisors for Rural Development in principles and methods of participatory development. The 'living university' is now established as a field-based programme for learning about how community development can be peacefully achieved in the Niger Delta.